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Abstract
Every scientific endeavour consists of (at least) two components: A hypothesis on the
one hand and data on the other. There is always a more or less abstract level - some
theory, a set of concepts, certain relations of ideas - and a concrete level, i.e., empirical
evidence, experiments or some observations which constitute matters of fact.
The focus of this contribution is on elementary models connecting both levels that
have been very popular in psychological research - statistical tests. Going from simple
to complex we will examine four paradigms of statistical testing (Fisher, Likelihood,
Bayes, Neyman & Pearson) and an elegant contemporary treatment.
In a nutshell, testing is an easy problem that has a straightforward mathematical
solution. However, it is rather surprising that the statistical mainstream has pursued a
different line of argument. The application of the latter theory in psychology and other
fields has brought some progress but has also impaired scientific thinking.1
1Key words and phrases: Statistical testing; tests of hypotheses; scientific thinking; modes of in-
ference; history of statistics; foundational issues
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1 Fisher: One Hypothesis
Every experiment may be said to exist only to give the facts a chance of
disproving the null hypothesis. (Fisher (1935), p. 16)
The simplest and oldest formal model is Fisher’s test of significance. There is just one
distribution, called the “hypothesis” H (or PH), and a sample from this population.
Formally, the random variables X,X1, . . . , Xn are iid, X ∼ PH , and Xi = xi are the
observations subsequently encountered (i = 1, . . . , n). Thus x = (x1, . . . , xn) is the
vector of data at hand.
In the continuous case, X has a density f(x), whereas in the discrete case, X as-
sumes values x1, x2, . . . with corresponding probabilities p1, p2, . . . Information the-
ory often restricts attention to random variables assuming values in a finite alphabet
X = {x1, . . . , xk}. In the following, in order to keep technical issues to a minimum, a
random variable will be discrete if not otherwise stated.
Given this setting, suppose one observes a single x for which p = PH(X = x) =
0. That is, this observation should not have occurred since the hypothesis does not
account for it. It is simply impossible to see x if PH is the case. In other words, this
concrete observation x falsifies the hypothesis PH , it is a counterexample to the law
PH . In philosophical jargon, this is a strict, logical conclusion (the modus tollens).
One concludes without any doubt, although formalized by the probability statement
(p = 0), that the hypothesis in question is not the case.
Now, what if p is “small”? Obviously, no matter how small the probability, as long as
p > 0, the observation x is possible and we cannot infer with rigour that X ∼ PH did
not produce it. All one may say is that
Either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred, or the theory [hypothesis]
of random distribution is not true. (Fisher (1956/73), p. 42, emphasis in
the original)
Of course, such an “inductive statistic” (IS) argument is much weaker than “deductive
nomological” (DN) conclusions, like the one considered before, and consequently a lot
of discussion has been spawned by Fisher’s dichotomy (see, e.g., Salmon (1989), Fetzer
(2001)). More important to our reasoning is the observation that no general statistical
theory evolved from Fisher’s dichotomy. Here are two reasons why: First, if X assumes
k distinct values x1, . . . , xk with probabilities p1, . . . , pk, “small” crucially depends on
the number of possible observations k. (A probability of p = 1/100 is small if k = 10,
however the same probability is rather large if k = 106 or k = 1020, say.) Second, if PH
is the uniform distribution, we have no reason whatsoever to discard the hypothesis
no matter which value occurs. Each and every xj is equally (un)likely, but possible
nonetheless. If PH has a geometric distribution, i.e., if X assumes the natural number
j (j ≥ 1) with probability 2−j it would be very difficult to tell beyond which number j0
the probability pj0 could be said to be “small”. Finally, for any continuous distribution,
in particular the standard normal, we have P (X = x) = 0 for every x. However, since
some realization must show up, some x will occur nevertheless.
Perhaps for reasons such as these, Fisher came up with a more sophisticated idea.
Typically, most values observed are rather “moderate”, and only a few are “extreme”
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outliers (very large or very small). Suppose large values of X are suspicious. Then,
having encountered x, it is straightforward to calculate p = PH(X ≥ x), the probability
of observing a value at least as large as x. If this so-called p-value is small, we have
reason to reject the hypothesis. Of course, if small values of X are suspicious, it is
PH(X ≤ x) that should be considered, and in the case of outliers to the left and to the
right of the origin, P (X ≥ |x|) is of interest. Thus we have a general rule: Calculate
the probability of the value observed and of all “more extreme” events. This kind of
evaluation may be crude, but it is also a straightforward way to quantify the evidence
in the data x about the hypothesis PH .
In the earliest test of this kind recorded, Arbuthnot (1710) looked at London births.
His hypothesis was that it is equally likely to have a boy or a girl. (Why should one of
the sexes be preferred?) Considering a moderate number n of years altogether, it would
not be astonishing if the boys outnumbered the girls in about n/2 years, but by the
laws of probability it would also not be surprising if there were more girls in perhaps
20 out of 30 years. However, it would be very surprising if, over a longer period of time,
one sex outnumbered the other permanently. As a matter of fact, Arbuthnot checked
n = 82 successive years and learned that in each and every year more boys than girls
were born. If PH(boy) = PH(girl) = 1/2, the probability of the event “boys always
outnumbering girls” happening by chance is 2−82. Thus he concluded that some force
“made” more boys than girls.
Suppose Arbuthnot had found 80 years with more boys than girls. Then Fisher’s advice
is to calculate
p = PH(X ≥ 80) = PH(X = 82) + PH(X = 81) + PH(X = 80) (1)
=
(
82
82
)
2−82 +
(
82
81
)
2−82 +
(
82
80
)
2−82 =
1 + 82 + 3321
282
=
3404
282
≈ 7 · 10−22.
Since all probabilities sum up to one, this seems to be a small value, and thus a
remarkable result. Fisher (1929), p. 191, writes:
It is a common practice to judge a result significant, if it is of such a
magnitude that it would have been produced by chance not more frequently
than once in twenty trials. This is an arbitrary, but convenient, level of
significance for the practical investigator [. . .]
Today, the standard levels of significance are 5%, 1%, and 0.1%. Although, “surely God
loves the 0.06 nearly as much as the 0.05?” (Rosnow und Rosenthal 1989)
1.1 Objections
Despite the above rather natural derivation, problems with p-values and their proper
interpretation turned out to be almost endless:
The smaller the p-value, the larger the evidence against some hypothesis H , an idea al-
ready stated explicitly in Berkson (1942). Thus one should be able to compare p-values
or combine p-values of different studies. Unfortunately, if two experiments produce the
same p-value, they do not provide the same amount of evidence, since other factors, in
particular the total number of observations n, also play a considerable role (Cornfield
1966: 19).
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Johnstone (1986), p. 496, elaborates: “Thus, as Jeffreys explained in 1939, if the sample
is very large, the level of significance P tends to exaggerate the evidence against the
null hypothesis, i.e. P tends to be smaller than it ought to be. But in practice, if the
sample is very large, a good orthodox statistician will ‘deflate’ intuitively the level of
significance P accordingly.”McPherson (1989) comments on this: “This is very likely
true, but it is an inadequate base for presenting the p value approach to scientists.”
The best one can do seems to be rules of thumb. For example, Efron und Gous (2001),
p. 212, consider the normal distribution and sample size n in order to translate p-values
into evidence. However, Royall (1986) demonstrates that contradictory statements are
possible: “A given P -value in a large trial is usually stronger evidence that the treat-
ments really differ than the same P -value in a small trial of the same treatments would
be” (Peto et al. (1976), p. 593). But also “The rejection of the null hypothesis when
the number of cases is small speaks for a more dramatic effect [. . .] if the p-value is the
same, the probability of committing a Type I error remains the same. Thus one can be
more confident with a small N than a large N” (Bakan (1970), p. 241) is a reasonable
line of argument.
In a nutshell, it is very difficult to interpret and combine p-values in a logically sat-
isfactory way (see Greenland et al. (2016), Hubbard and Lindsay (2008) for recent
overviews). Schmidt (1996), p. 126, also collects common ideas, in particular,
If my findings are not significant, then I know that they probably just
occurred by chance and that the true difference is probably zero. If the
result is significant, then I know I have a reliable finding. The p values from
the significance test tell me whether the relationship in my data are large
enough to be important or not. I can also determine from the p value what
the chances are that these findings would replicate if I conducted a new
study
and then concludes that “every one of these thoughts about the benefits of signifi-
cance testing is false.” The most devastating point, however, seems to be the following
consideration.
1.2 The Observed and the Unobserved
The distinction between the observed and the unobserved is fundamental to science.
Science is built on facts, not speculation. Why have eminent statisticians confounded
these two areas?
It is not difficult to see how ‘Student’ and Fisher found themselves de-
fending the use of the P integral. For if one accepts that it is possible to
test a null hypothesis without specifying an alternative, and that the test
must be based on the value of a test statistic in conjunction with its known
sampling distribution on the null hypothesis, then the integral of the dis-
tribution between specified limits is the only measure which is invariant
to transformation of the statistic. It follows that one is virtually forced to
consider the area between the realized value of the statistic and a boundary
as the rejection area - the P integral, in fact. (Edwards (1992), p. 178)
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In other words, although the last paragraph can be interpreted as an invariance ar-
gument in favour of p-values,2 Fisher, considering a single hypothesis, simply had no
other choice but to calculate P integrals such as (1). He knew that this way to proceed
was not really sound:
Objection has sometimes been made that the method of calculating confi-
dence limits by setting an assigned value such as 1% on the frequency of
observing 3 or less [. . .] is unrealistic treating values less than 3, which have
not been observed, in exactly the same manner as 3, which is the one that
has been observed. This feature is indeed not very defensible save as an
approximation. (Fisher (1956/73), p. 71)
However, a rather straightforward example illustrates that even the roundabout idea
of “approximation” is difficult to defend. Suppose PH(X < x) = 0.01 and PH(X =
x) = 0.02, small values of X being suspicious. If x is observed, the one-sided test may
reject PH since PH(X ≤ x) = 0.03. Now look at the (modified) hypothesis K where
PK(X = x) = 0.02, but PK(X < x) = 0.4. In this case PK(X ≤ x) = 0.42 and no
test would reject K. Yet the probability of the observed value x is the same for both
hypotheses! The conclusion differs tremendously just because of values that were not
observed:
An hypothesis that may be true is rejected because it has failed to predict
observable results that have not occurred. This seems a remarkable proce-
dure. On the face of it, the evidence might more reasonably be taken as
evidence for the hypothesis, not against it. (Jeffreys (1939), p. 316)
Altogether, Fisher’s paradigm seems to be too coarse. What is needed are more elab-
orated models, able to distinguish between observed and merely possible values, and
explicitly formalizing other relevant aspects, such as the probability of committing an
error or the strength of some effect.
2 Two hypotheses
In order to keep things as simple as possible, E. S. Pearson (1938), p. 242, proposed
the following move:
[. . .] the only valid reason for rejecting a statistical hypothesis is that some
alternative hypothesis explains the observed events with a greater degree
of probability.3
Given (at least) two hypotheses H and K, it is of fundamental importance to un-
derstand that there are two completely different ways to generalize Fisher’s approach.
Either one sticks with integrals, which is the main feature of the Neyman-Pearson
theory, or one directly compares PH(x) with PK(x). We will start with the latter idea:
2Even if the measuring process is rather arbitrary, and only the ordering of the values recorded
corresponds to something real, the p-value makes sense, since P (X ≥ x) = P (f(X) ≥ f(x)) for any
monotone transformation f .
3As early as 1926, Gosset wrote to E.S. Pearson: “[. . .] if there is any alternative hypothesis [. . .]
you will be much more inclined to consider that the original hypothesis is not true [. . .]” (See Royall
(1997), p. 68, and the discussion in Hodges (1990), pp. 76.)
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2.1 Likelihood Ratio Tests
Given two hypotheses, it is perhaps most obvious to study the ratio PK(x)/PH(x).
In particular, since “. . . a proper measure of strength of evidence should not depend
on probabilities of unobserved values” (Royall (1997), p. 69). Obviously, a ratio larger
than one is evidence in favour of K, and a ratio that is smaller than one provides
evidence in favour of H .
With successive observations x1, x2, . . . evidence for (and against) some hypothesis
should build up. Mathematically, it is straightforward to consider the likelihood ratio,
i.e., the product
rn = rn(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∏
i=1
PK(xi)
PH(xi)
. (2)
With every observation, the odds change in favour of one of the hypotheses (and thus,
simultaneously, against the other). Let PXn be the empirical distribution of a sample
of size n. Due to the law of large numbers, PXn(x) → PH(x) for every x ∈ X almost
surely, if PH is the true distribution. This basic result almost immediately implies the
likelihood convergence theorem: That is, (2) converges almost surely to zero ifH is true,
and to +∞ if K is true. (See Royall (1997), p. 32, for discrete probability distributions
and Chow and Teicher (1997), p. 257, for densities.)
It thus seems to be justified to decide in favour of K if the likelihood ratio exceeds
some pre-assigned threshold s (s > 1). As Robbins (1970) showed, if H is correct, the
probability that the ratio at one point of time exceeds s is just 1/s. Formally:
P
(
n∏
i=1
PK(Xi)
PH(Xi)
≥ s for some n = 1, 2, . . .
)
≤ 1
s
Notice that even “if an unscrupulous researcher sets out deliberately to find evidence
supporting his favourite hypothesis [K] over his rival’s [H ], which happens to be correct,
by a factor of at least [s], then the chances are good that he will be eternally frustrated”
(Royall (1997), p. 7).
Since the normal distribution is particularly important, Royall (1997), p. 52, considers
it in much detail and finds that s = 8 and s = 16, or s = 1/8 = 0.125 and s =
1/16 = 0.0625, respectively, are reasonable choices. For more details see Royall (2000),
Goodman und Royall (1988), and Bookstein (2014), p. 194, who reproduces Jeffreys’
rule of thumb: rn > 1 supports K, 1 > rn > 0.3 supports H , “but not worth more
than a bare comment.” However, the evidence in favour of H (and thus, equivalently,
against K) is
substantial if 0.3 > rn > 0.1 very strong if 0.03 > rn > 0.01
strong if 0.1 > rn > 0.03 decisive if 0.01 > rn
2.2 Bayesian Tests
The likelihood ratio may serve as the core piece of a Bayesian analysis. To this end
let piH be the prior probability of the first hypothesis, and piK = 1 − piH the prior
probability of the second. Having observed x = (x1, . . . , xn), Bayes’ theorem states
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that the odds ratio of the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses is
pi(K|x1, . . . , xn)
pi(H|x1, . . . , xn) = rn(x1, . . . , xn) ·
piK
piH
=
n∏
i=1
PK(xi)
PH(xi)
· piK
piH
. (3)
If 0 < piH < 1, i.e., if both hypotheses are considered possible at the beginning, there
are convergence results of a very general nature that guarantee that the true hypothesis
will be found almost surely (e.g., Walker (2003, 2004)).
Moreover, it is possible to emulate Fisher’s idea of a single explicit hypothesis. (For an
example, see Bookstein (2014), pp. 197.)
2.3 Neyman and Pearson
Mathematicians J. Neyman and E.S. Pearson also improved upon Fisher’s initial idea.
In theory as well as in applications, their line of reasoning has become standard. Like
Fisher, they used integrals, i.e., probabilities like P (X ≥ x). However, in order to avoid
confounding the observed with the unobserved, they insisted that such probabilities be
computed in advance, i.e., before recording empirical data.
Their paradigm situation is as follows: Denote by N(µ, σ) the normal distribution with
expected value µ and standard deviation σ. Let PH ∼ N(µH , σ), PK ∼ N(µK , σ),
and suppose without loss of generality that the absolute effect size η = µK − µH is
non-negative. Since for both hypothesis and each x the densities ϕH(x) and ϕK(x) are
positive, we can never be sure which hypothesis is the case. All we can do is try to
minimize the error of the first kind (a decision in favour of K, although H is true) and
the error of the second kind (a decision in favour of H , although K is true).
Given population H or K, the mean X¯n =
∑
Xj/n of the observations is also normally
distributed with parameters µ
′
, the correct hypothesis’ expected value, and standard
deviation σ/
√
n. (Thus, the larger the sample, the smaller the mean’s standard devia-
tion.) A rather straightforward treatment of this situation would look for the point m
where ϕH(x) = ϕK(x) which, due to symmetry, is just m = (µH+µK)/2, and decide in
favour of H if x < m, and in favour of K if x ≥ m. This leads to the total probability
of error
Pe(n) = αn + βn = P (X¯n ≥ m|H) + P (X¯n < m|K) (4)
which can be made arbitrarily small with growing n, for any fixed η = µK − µH > 0.
However, perhaps since the errors of the first and of the second kind have different
consequences, Neyman and Pearson decided to treat the null hypothesis H (typically
representing “no effect”) and the alternativeK (representing a substantial effect) asym-
metrically. With n and the effect size η thus given, Neyman und Pearson (1933), pp.
79, advised as follows:
From the point of view of mathematical theory all that we can do is to
show how the risk of the errors [α, β] may be controlled and minimized.
The use of these statistical tools in any given case, in determining just how
the balance [between the two kinds of errors] should be struck, must be left
to the investigator.
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They also fixed α (i.e, the level of error of the first kind, meaning that an effect
is detected although there is none). Now they could look for the optimum decision
procedure, minimizing β, which they determined in Neyman und Pearson (1933).
Knowing the best test, one can also control for the errors (e.g., by fixing α to 0.01,
and assuming β = 0.3, say), and set out to detect an effect of a certain size η with the
minimum number of observations n necessary. E. S. Pearson (1955), p. 207, explains:
The appropriate test is one which, while involving (through the choice of
its significance level [α]) only a very small risk of discarding my working
hypothesis [H ] prematurely will enable me to demonstrate with assurance
[1−β] (but without any unnecessary amount of experimentation) the reality
of the influences which I suspect may be present [K].
In this view, every observation comes with a cost and a major goal of the statistical
design of experiments is to make just enough observations in order to convincingly
demonstrate a certain effect - n is just as large as necessary, not as large as possible.
For example, upon designing a clinical trial, it is now mandatory to calculate the
number of patients necessary, given α, β, and η. More generally speaking, this way to
proceed can be extended to an “a priori power analysis” (Cohen 1988, Ellis 2010), also
well known to psychologists.
3 Some consequences
3.1 The standard style of inference
Suppose there is an effect η of a certain size, and the sample size n is fixed. Then
the investigation hinges strongly on the asymmetry between α and β, being treated
differently. Cornfield (1966), p. 21, wasn’t the only one to question this choice:
It is clear that the entire basis for sequential analysis [and much of received
testing theory] depends upon nothing more profound than a preference for
minimizing β for given α rather than minimizing their linear combination.
Rarely has so mighty a structure and one so surprising to scientific common
sense, rested on so frail a distinction and so delicate a preference.
In practice, researchers did not use the additional degree of freedom introduced by
Neyman und Pearson (1933) either. Despite their and Fisher’s advice, rather coarse
standards such as α = 0.05, or Cohen’s (1988, 1992) classification of effects (small,
medium, large) caught on, until testing became a “ritual” (Gigerenzer et al. 2004).
With all parameters set in advance, a test is indeed a strict decision procedure, and
“the basic objection to this program is that it is too rigid. . .” (Lehmann (1993), p. 70).
In fact, it is well known that the procedure is so tight that it cannot be extended at
all:
An experimenter, having made n observations in the expectation that they
would permit the rejection of a particular hypothesis, at some predesignated
significance level, say .05, finds that he has not quite attained his critical
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level. He still believes that the hypothesis is false and asks how many more
observations would be required to have reasonable certainty of rejecting the
hypothesis [. . .]4
Under these circumstances it is evident that there is no amount of additional
information, no matter how large, which would permit rejection at the .05
level. If the hypothesis being tested is true, there is a .05 of its having been
rejected after the first round of observations. To this chance must be added
the probability of rejecting after the second round, given failure to reject
after the first, and this increases the total chance of erroneous rejection
to above .05 [. . .] Thus no amount of additional evidence can be collected
which would provide evidence against the hypothesis equivalent to rejection
at the P = 0.05 level [. . .] (Cornfield (1966), p. 19)
In other words: In this perspective, α is a limited, non-renewable resource. “Once we
have spent this error rate, it is gone” (Tukey (1991), pp. 104). Thus it has to be used
with great care: [. . .] a very few prespecified comparisons will be allowed to eat up the
available error rate, and the remaining comparisons have the logical status of hints,
no matter what statistical techniques may be used to study them. (Tukey (1991), pp.
104)
In order to avoid an “inflation” of error, it seems wise to distribute the error rate of 5%
say, among all tests planned. The standard technique is to adjust α, a priori, by some
scheme taking the whole family of tests into account. Salsburg (1985), p. 221, reports
the consequences of such a consistent attitude:
Finally, we should consider the subclass of practitioners who are ‘more holy
than the Pope,’ so to speak. To these practitioners, the whole purpose of the
religion of Statistics is to maintain the sanctity of the alpha level (which is
another name for 0.05). No activity that appears to involve looking at data
for sensible combinations of interesting effects is allowed. It is forbidden,
in fact, to do anything more than to compute the p value using a method
determined in advance of the experiment and fully documented at that
time.
Note also that if only a small proportion of α is spent in every test, the overall pro-
cedure becomes very conservative: In the Neyman-Pearson framework, a very small α
corresponds to an inflation of β and thus deteriorating power 1 − β. Since research in
the social sciences is generally plagued by low power, this attitude makes it even more
difficult to detect effects. Ellis (2010), p. 79, concludes:
Instead of dealing with the very credible threat of Type II errors, researchers
have been imposing increasingly stringent controls to deal with the rela-
tively unlikely threat of Type I errors (Schmidt 1992). In view of these
trade-offs, adjusting alpha may be a bit like spending $1,000 to buy insur-
ance for a $500 watch.
Royall (1991), p. 57, states another way to deal with the problem described by Tukey.
Instead of lowering α for each test, one simply restricts the number of planned tests:
4See also Royall (1997), p. 111
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. . .do not allow those who are conducting the trial to look at the results
as they accumulate. That is, [. . .] conceal the evidence from the physician
until the trial is completed.
Altogether, the Neyman-Pearson framework gives some justification for minimizing the
amount of information collected, and the number of looks at the data. This fits well with
Popper’s rationalistic view, who always emphasized the role of theory and deduction in
the guise of falsification, downplaying the role of data, and rejecting induction firmly
(Popper 1959, Popper and Miller 1983). However, scientific common sense and practice
rather point in the opposite direction: If we are to learn from experience, an open-
minded attitude and any reasonable analysis, be it hypothesis- or data-driven, should
be encouraged. Keiding (1995), p. 242, admits that
[. . .] it is indeed unsatisfactory to have to defend, perhaps in the face of
senior, highly qualified substantive scientists, our mainstream statistical
thinking which assumes that you are not supposed to look at the data when
searching for methods of optimal analysis with the purpose of gaining new
knowledge.
3.2 Confusion
Since there are several theories (at least two), each of them accompanied by a certain
“logic”, data analysis is a tricky business, and there is also lot of confusion.
In particular, despite their mathematical similarity, data-dependent p-values and error
levels set in advance are completely different. It is against the grain of the Neyman-
Pearson theory to calculate α-levels a posteriori (for example, one, two or three stars
indicating that some empirical result has been significant at the 0.05, 0.01 or the
0.001-level), to report p-values instead of zero-one decisions, or to restrict attention
to one hypothesis (typically the null, although two hypotheses might be mentioned).
Nevertheless, practice and textbooks use p-values and α-levels almost interchangeably,
thus creating an “alphabet soup” (Hubbard 2004).
On a less formal level, there is also much conceptual confusion, (inductive) evidence in
Fisher’s sense and (deductive) decisions in Neyman’s and Pearson’s being conflated:
This hybrid is essentially Fisherian in its logic, but it plays lip service to
the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing [. . .] Some researchers do use the
Neyman-Pearson theory of testing in a pure form, but they constitute a
small minority [. . .] Regardless of their terminology and verbal allegiance,
most researchers in the fields mentioned above use and/or accept as valid
a pattern of inductive reasoning that is characteristic for the Fisherian test
of significance. (Spielman (1974), p. 211)
It is a crucial ingredient of the standard Neyman-Pearson theory to treat the hypotheses
asymmetrically. Typically, the null hypothesis represents the idea that pure chance
produced the data at hand, whereas its alternative claims that an interesting substantial
effect has left its traces in the data. Obviously, any “logic of empirical science” demands
that the more data there is, the more difficult it should be for a substantial hypothesis
to succeed: “. . . in physics and the related disciplines the parent theory is subjected
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to ever more critical examination as measurement techniques, in their broadest sense,
improve. That is, as power increases the ‘observational hurdle’ that the theory must
clear becomes greater.” (Oakes (1986), pp. 40)
In other words, as information accrues, it becomes easier to detect if the data deviate
from a particular hypothesis. For example, suppose your hypothesis (derived from
basic theory) claims that about 6.6 · 1010 neutrinos should hit the surface of the earth
per second and cm2. Then measurements should confirm this guess, i.e., the number of
neutrinos actually counted should be close to 6.6·1010/s·cm2. In the jargon of statistical
tests this means that “[. . .] in the physical sciences the substantive theory is associated
with the null hypothesis and to the extent that it defies rejection it commands respect”
(cf. Oakes (1986), p. 41. For a contemporary example see van Dyk (2014).)
However, “the opposite is the case in the social and behavioural sciences [. . .] In psy-
chology and the social sciences the substantive theory is associated with the alternative
hypothesis and is corroborated as the null hypothesis is rejected. In this sense the ob-
servational hurdle which the theory must clear is lowered as power or experimental
precision is increased. This is the great weakness of identifying a theory with the al-
ternative hypothesis, to defend such a practice [. . .] is a nonsense” (Oakes (1986), pp.
40).
Putting it crudely, if you have enough cases and your measures are not
totally unreliable, the null hypothesis will always be falsified, regardless of
the truth of the substantive theory (Meehl (1978), p. 822, emphasis in the
original).
Perhaps it is quite telling that, although this phenomenon was described by an eminent
psychophysicist 50 years ago (Meehl 1967), and has been decried many times ever
since (e.g., Meehl (1990, 1997), Gelman et al. (2013), Bookstein (2014)), this kind
of “mindless statistics” (Gigerenzer 2004) has thrived (Hubbard und Ryan 2000). Its
“career” is quite similar and related to that of p-values which, despite their major
shortcomings, have also become standard in many sciences, psychology included.
4 The scientific style of inference
Scientists, statisticians and philosophers have written much about this state of affairs
(e.g., Neyman (1955, 1961), Good (1988), Barnett (1999), Dienes (2011), Cumming
(2014), Spanos (2014), Haig (2016)). Instead of adding another opinion, it may be
wiser to go back to the original issue. Since Fisher’s elementary setting is too coarse
and leads immediately to almost inextricable problems, there is a consensus that two
hypotheses should be considered. Alas, the former section shows that Neyman’s and
Pearson’s treatment has led to disappointment. This is quite astounding since the basic
problem is rather elementary, and one thus expects an elegant, satisfactory answer.
Looking at the models from a mathematical point of view, the P integral springs to
mind. Introduced by Fisher - faute de mieux - it is given the leading part in the standard
two-hypotheses setting, and is at the root of all subsequent trouble. More precisely: To
keep up the basic distinction between the observed and the unobserved, one has to stick
to a strict prior viewpoint. Since this is hardly possible and has curious consequences,
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it is no coincidence that Neyman’s and Pearson’s stance has merged with Fisher’s
position (and later ideas), almost inevitably creating confusion and endless discussion.
Yet, despite all scientific and philosophical turmoil, it is important to see that the
origin is just the particular mathematical treatment of the basic problem:
(i) Considering intervals like PH(X ≤ x) instead of point probabilities,
(ii) dealing with the hypotheses in an asymmetric manner, and
(iii) putting all parameters constituting a standard test on a par
makes testing more complicated than it needed to have been:
a) Power analysis hinges on the idea that the level of significance α, power 1 − β,
effect size η and sample size n “. . . are so related that any one of them is a function
of the other three, which means that when any three of them are fixed, the fourth is
completely determined” (Cohen (1988), p. 14). However, consistently, given α, β and
η, this line of thought also supposes that a small sample is optimum (E. S. Pearson
1955). More importantly, formulae such as (4) indicate that α and β had better depend
on n. In particular, α(n) should be a decreasing function in n (see, e.g., section 1.1,
Lindley (1957), and Naaman (2016)).
b) The “scientific” power of a certain study is not 1−β, but its contribution to a series
of experiments, all investigating the same phenomenon (Ottenbacher 1996). To this
end, the effect size η is much more important:
. . .the emphasis on significance levels tends to obscure a fundamental dis-
tinction between the size of an effect and its statistical significance. Regard-
less of sample size, the size of an effect in one study is a reasonable estimate
of the size of an effect in replication (Tversky and Kahneman (1971), p.
110).5
c) Orthodox theory was mainly developed in a time when observations were “expen-
sive”, i.e., when n was almost always small and typically also fixed. Yet, since infor-
mation accrues with data, the overall attitude toward n should be quite the opposite:
There are no inferential grounds whatsoever for preferring a small sam-
ple [. . .] the larger the sample the better [. . .] The larger the sample size
the more stable the estimate of effect size; the better the information, the
sounder the basis from which to make a decision [. . .] (Oakes (1986), pp.
29, 32)
In everyday life, this often means collecting data until the evidence has built up suffi-
ciently:
An experiment involving an image-producing apparatus often ends appro-
priately with a ‘golden event’, that is, a picture or image of something whose
existence has been conjectured, but possibly questioned. An experiment
5Guttman (1985), pp. 3, adds: “The emphasis on statistical significance over scientific significance
in education and research represents a corrupt form of the scientific method. . .”
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involving a counting apparatus often ends appropriately when a decision
based on some probability model suggests that enough counts have been
taken for some purpose. (Ackermann (1989), p. 189)6
Altogether, n and η seem to be much more important than α and β. It is also no
coincidence that any philosophy (Neyman 1977, Mayo 1996) based on a suboptimal
formal treatment yields results that are at variance with common sense.
The following table summarizes main findings:
Approach Probability model Math. Treatment Criticism
Fisher Observation x, and simple: 1 hypothesis underparameterized
region, e.g., P (X ≥ x) p-value Jeffreys (1939)
Neyman Partition: PH(X < m) 2 hypotheses H,K strict prior view
& Pearson versus PK(X ≥ m). α, β, η and n, with treat. not elegant
“mainstream” Obs. x→ decision emphasis on α, β wrong emphasis
Likelihood Obs. x, and ratio straightforward: posterior view
PK(X = x) 2 hypotheses, and
PH(X = x) emphasis on η, n
Bayes Likelihood ratio 2 hypotheses posterior view
and prior probs. evidence and / vs. prior probabilities
piH , piK prior information overparameterized
5 Testing need not be complicated
Due to the law of large numbers, testing is an easy problem: If n is not too small, the
empirical distribution of the data PXn is (in any reasonable sense) close to the true
distribution PH . The test of one hypothesis gives a formalized answer to the simple
question: Is the data I have observed compatible with my hypothesis? If there are two
or several hypotheses, the question becomes: Given my set of data, which hypothesis
should I choose? Qualitatively speaking, it is reasonable to choose the hypothesis which
is closest to the data, and to reject a hypothesis if the data is “far away” from PH . (A
formal treatment is given below.)
Given this, the standpoint taken by Neyman und Pearson (1933), p. 74, looks rather
surprising:
If x is a continuous variable . . . then any value of x is a singularity of rel-
ative probability equal to zero. We are inclined to think that as far as a
particular hypothesis is concerned, no test based upon a theory of probabil-
ity (Footnote: cases will of course, arise where the verdict of a test is based
on certainty. . .) can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or
falsehood of that hypothesis.
In the light of the above discussion, these statements - still very popular today - permute
rule and exception. They are much too pessimistic, since, owing to the (very) general
convergence results, no matter whether the variables are discrete or continuous, given
6If some insight thus occurs all of a sudden, the crucial last step, with a wink, has been called the
interocular traumatic test: “You know what the data mean when the conclusion hits you between the
eyes” (Edwards et al. (1962), also see Bookstein (2014)).
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enough observations, H and K can be distinguished with hardly any doubt left. For
example, just a few throws suffice to decide between a cube with the numbers {0, . . . , 5},
and a cube with the numbers {1, . . . , 6}. More generally speaking, if the support of H
and K is not the same (i.e., if there exists some x such that PH(x) = 0 and PK(x) > 0,
or vice versa), one is able to discriminate deterministically between the hypotheses
after just a finite number of observations.
Of course, for any continuous random variable X , and any realization x, P (X = x) = 0.
Therefore, given two such hypotheses, one has to consider their densities, fH(x) and
fK(x) say. In the case of the normal family (and many others), the support of any two
densities coincides. Thus, rather trivially, no matter which x is observed, one cannot
decide for sure if H or K is the case. However, the ratio fK(x)/fH(x) gives valuable
evidence and much more so will rn(x1, . . . , xn) if n is not too small. Asymptotically,
any doubt vanishes completely.
A contemporary treatment, focussing on information and (generalized) distance of
distributions, is as follows. Suppose there are two hypotheses H,K, represented by
their distributions PH , PK . Define their KL-divergence (Kullback and Leibler 1951):
D(PK ||PH) =
∑
x∈X
PK(x) log
PK(x)
PH(x)
,
where D(PK ||PH) <∞, and, for the sake of mathematical simplicity, X is a finite set.
D(PK ||PH) may be interpreted as a “generalized distance” between distributions; since
its introduction, it has become a core concept of information theory and beyond (e.g.,
see Cover und Thomas (2006), pp. 377, and their pointers to the literature).
The key result, connecting the (log) likelihood ratio and KL-divergence is
log
PK(x1, . . . , xn)
PH(x1, . . . , xn)
=
∑
i
log
PK(xi)
PH(xi)
= n (D(PXn ||PH)−D(PXn||PK)) , (5)
where PXn is the empirical distribution of the data.
In the most complete (i.e., Bayesian) setting, H and K are endowed with prior proba-
bilities, piH and piK , respectively. Given an iid sample x1, . . . , xn from either PH or PK ,
let An ⊆ Xn be the acceptance region for H , depending on n. Thus one obtains the
error probabilities αn = PH(A¯n) and βn = PK(An), where A¯n denotes the complement
of An, i.e., the acceptance region of K. Finally, it is straightforward to minimize the
total probability of error Pe(n) = piHαn + piKβn.
Thus it turns out (Cover und Thomas (2006), p. 388) that “the optimum decision rule
is to choose the hypothesis with the maximum a posteriori probability,” which means
to choose K if piKPK(X1, . . . , Xn) > piHPH(X1, . . . , Xn), and H , if the inequality is in
the other direction. Equivalently, the best strategy is a decision in favour of K if
log
piK
piH
+
∑
i
log
PK(Xi)
PH(Xi)
> 0,
and in favour of H otherwise. Because of (5), the latter inequality is tantamount to a
decision in favour of K if and only if
log(1/piH) + nD(PXn ||PH) > log(1/piK) + nD(PXn ||PK).
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Without prior probabilities, it is reasonable to decide in favour of K if the empirical
distribution is “closer” to PK , i.e., ifD(PXn||PH) > D(PXn||PK).More generally speak-
ing, because of (5), a decision in favour of K if PK(x1, . . . , xn)/PH(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ s, i.e.,
if the likelihood ratio exceeds a certain threshold (s ≥ 1), is equivalent to a decision
in favour of K if D(PXn ||PH) − 1n log s ≥ D(PXn ||PK). In other words, the likelihood
ratio test advises choosing K if the divergence D(PXn||PK) is smaller than D(PXn||PH)
minus the asymptotically vanishing “safety margin” (log s)/n ≥ 0. Moreover, if K is
true,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
PK(X1, . . . , Xn)
PH(X1, . . . , Xn)
→ D(PK ||PH) in probability.
The test closest to Fisher’s original idea is Hoeffding’s “universal test”, which merely
compares the data with a fixed hypothesis. It decides in favour of H if the empirical
distribution is within a certain acceptance region An about PH , i.e., if
D(PXn ||PH) ≤ cn.
Because of the law of large numbers, the sequence cn decreases rapidly with increasing
n. (For details see Hoeffding (1965), theorems 7.1 and 5.1.)
6 Discussion and conclusions
At first glance, it seems to be a drawback that KL-divergence is not a proper metric. In
particular, given two distributions PH and PK , in general, D(PH ||PK) 6= D(PK ||PH).
However, in the case of data and hypotheses this is an advantage, since there is a striking
asymmetry between moving from specific observations to general laws (induction) and
the opposite direction (deduction).
Hoeffding’s test starts with a hypothesis H and asks if the data lies within a circle of
radius cn about PH . An even more straightforward way to proceed would be to start
with data xn = (x1, . . . , xn) and ask if PH lies within a circle of radius c
′
n about the
empirical distribution. There is a real difference: Hoeffeding looks for data compatible
with some conjectured hypothesis, whereas the second approach conditions on the data
and looks for hypotheses that are compatible with the observations.
At least from a mathematical point of view, asymptotically, these preferences do not
matter, since, if H is the true hypothesis, by the law of large numbers PXn(a)→ PH(a)
for every a ∈ X in probability (and almost surely). Thus, for every a with PH(a) > 0,
lim
n→∞
PXn(a)
PH(a)
= lim
n→∞
PH(a)
PXn(a)
= 1
which implies limn→∞D(PXn ||PH) = D(PH ||PXn) = 0 with probability one.
In total generality, i.e., in philosophy, deduction is regarded as rather unproblematic.
However, the problem of induction has haunted statistics, philosophy, and perhaps also
the sciences at least since David Hume’s time (Howson 2003). A standard statistical
test is a particularly simple model to study these matters - a “test bed” if you allow the
play on words. Any such test considers hypotheses (typically two), collects an iid sample
x1, . . . , xn, and finally decides in favour of or against a hypothesis. Schematically:
PH [. . .] PK
տ ր
(x1, . . . , xn)
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Philosophers named this kind of reasoning “inference to the best explanation” (Lipton
2004), but also leading statisticians have always been well aware of the basic issue
involved. While Fisher (1935, 1955) and his school thought in terms of inductive infer-
ence, Neyman (1977) sided with the deductive line of argument. Considering a single
experiment, Fisher thus calculates the p-value, expressing the evidence in the data
against a hypothesis. Starting with hypotheses, instead, Neyman and Pearson focus on
probabilities of error and how to control them.7
In the end, the strong link between Neyman’s Frequentist school and Popper’s critical
rationalism strengthened both points of view, with the consequence that their posi-
tions succeeded after the death of their major opponents (Fisher died in 1962, and
Carnap in 1970). In particular, induction was banned, and mathematical statistics su-
perseded semantic reasoning to an extent that even analyzing given sets of data became
suspicious.
Since the 1970s, many statisticians, scientists and philosophers have worked on over-
coming this distorted view (e.g., Tukey (1977), Hedges und Olkin (1985), Ghosh (1988),
Schmidt (1992, 1996), Berthold und Hand (2003), Jaynes (2003), Heckman (2005),
Howson und Urbach (2006), Rissanen (2007), Hurlbert and Lombardi (2009), Pearl
(2009), Ellis (2010), Bookstein (2014)). Perhaps since the “big questions” thus de-
manded much attention, rather elementary facts like those pointed out in this contri-
bution could be overlooked easily.
With respect to testing, it is most significant that due to the law of large numbers,
the distance between sample and population shrinks (quickly) when n gets larger. This
basic insight makes testing an easy problem: Given enough data - and thus information
- the true distribution comes into focus almost inevitably. Therefore, mathematically,
all approaches based on the straightforward ratio PK(X = x)/PH(X = x) lead to
unequivocal and strong convergence results. In other words, sufficiently precise and
distinct hypotheses can be tested efficiently, at least, if the hypotheses are treated in a
rather symmetric way (Royall 1997, Robert 2007).
On a larger scale, testing not only allows for an elegant treatment, but putting infor-
mation first - e.g., formalized with the help of KL-divergence - gives sound answers to
quite a few questions. For example, if there is an uncountable number of hypotheses,
e.g., a parameterized family of distributions Pθ(x), Fisher’s likelihood function Lx(θ)
provides the key to an elegant solution, which can be extended to an enormously general
and powerful information-oriented approach that is perfectly compatible with scientific
common sense (e.g., Aldrich (1997), Burnham and Anderson (2002), Li and Vita´nyi
(2008)).
Finally, it should be mentioned that particular formal treatments are associated with
certain schools of thought - and it is rather the detailed treatment that triggers the
overall attitude than vice versa (methods first, philosophy second). Therefore, quite
straightforwardly, an elegant mathematical treatment comes with a “moderate” and
reasonable standpoint, whereas questionable decisions lead to rather “extremist” points
of view. The above example demonstrates that it may take decades - filled with exces-
sive discussions ranging from formal minutiae to philosophical principles - to overcome
a popular, yet distorted, paradigm.
7Quite similarly, Bayesians focus on the data at hand, whereas orthodox theory is much more
concerned with the process producing the data.
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